Talk Morgan Forums Community The Malvern Arms The Sickness of Boeing

I would have thought that that should be upper management centric.

+1. Totally agree Peter.

It's a real issue that so many publicly listed companies seem to be run for the benefit of the short term interests of the senior management rather than for the long term interests of the shareholders.

They still had plenty of clunkers along the way.... eg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_XB-15

With more than 400 737 Max aircraft in storage Boeing stop production.

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50817124

Cripes "33 hours aloft at 150 knots". I thought the shackleton crews had it bad.

Not wanting to kick someone when they are down but it does still seem a little presumptuous that they continued to make them in pretty much the same way (ticking a couple of extras on the options list and doing a software bug upgrade does not count as a new plane) during this time. I appreciate that you need to pay staff and this is a way of making use of their time but it also feels like the wrong PR/Trust thing to do when your company has just been cannoned into the sin bin. If I had real regret about how the process had played out I could not have been the one that signed off on continuing to make the same plane. It indicates to me that there is not a real regret among management and that shareholder value is placed higher. Real regret would see that the fundamental design flaw was engineered out and something trustworthy was delivered.

Not good for the US economy either as Boeing's production is worth 0.6% of GDP. That plus the knock on effect of stopping production is going to hit hard. Clearly they thought they were going to get the aircraft back in the air without too many problems, but equally clearly they are trying to get around basic design flaws that the Federal Aviation Authority is unwilling to accept after the shake-up and scandals following the crashes.

I, for one, would be very unwilling to fly in one of these aircraft until they have proved themselves to be safe.

Being a Retired Boeing Employee and living only a few miles from the Renton Plant I am very distressed that this happened in the first place and the Cavalier attitude that Upper Management has taken to work around this disaster. There is a lesson here. But I don't think it has been learned even now. FAA is correct to take it slow and be thourough.

I remember their initial response after the second crash: it's only minor software fix that's easy to introduce. Here we are nearly a year later and still no fix.
Personally I'll never fly on one as I don't trust them and the design is flawed in my opinion.

Not one to shrink away from any aeroplane having made it my career for 35 years, but there is no way I will ever get on a MAX either.

It's been a tragic and expensive 'lesson' for Boeing... with $$/profit/speed etc directing 'design'... The market/design 'brief' should have 100% meant a 'clean sheet' aircraft. Especially in the light of the lessons and huge technology leaps that were available from the R&D, design and development of the brilliant all composite B787

I just hope this leads to some wholesale changes from both manufacturer and regulator so this scenario is never repeated.